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and the Religious Worldview
PART II
nishida KitarO
CHAPTER THREE
SO FAR, I have discussed what the source and the foundation of 
religious awareness are and what religious questions are. Needless to 
say, religious questions are neither epistemological questions about the 
recognition of the object, nor are they moral questions directed to the 
volitional self about the moral obligation directed to the volitional self. 
They are rather concerned with the existence of the self and where it ex­
ists—with the very essence of the self and its whereabouts. It is because 
we are religiously aware that we struggle with these questions and strive 
to solve them. We do not struggle with what merely transcends us or 
what is simply external to us; only when the questions concern our own 
existence do we grapple with them. The more immediate the problem is 
for us, the more we are bothered by it. Granted, conscience transcends 
us; but because it transcends us from within, the pangs of conscience
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shake us from the ground of our being. Moral anguish reminds us that 
we cannot hide from our own conscience, but in moral anguish we are 
conscious of the presence of our self. Moreover, insofar as we exist as 
rational beings, we are tormented by conscience, since it is reason that 
is thought to render us autonomous.
I did consider the existence of self in terms of the predicative aspect. 
The activity of consciousness is established as the self-determination of 
the predicative aspect. And yet the self is not merely universal, 
predicative existence, but something thoroughly individual and voli­
tional. It exists where the individual completely negates the universal 
and harbors the possibility of breaking the law. To proceed merely in 
the direction of the universal is to negate one’s freedom. It amounts to 
losing oneself, by reducing the self to an entity of Euclidean geometry. 
But the self exists neither in the negation of reason nor in the negation 
of the universal. What is merely irrational is animal existence. The 
more we think about our self, the more self-contradictory it appears. 
Dostoyevsky dealt with these questions profoundly in his novels.
What makes the self the authentic self? What lends the self its true 
autonomy? We cannot help but raise these questions about the very 
foundation of our existence. Only from there can we proceed to 
scholarly pursuits and moral inquiry. Real values must be founded on 
the authentic existence of the self. Some may regard it as useless to ask 
such questions, considering it enough for human beings to act accor­
ding to conscience; others may regard it as evil to raise doubts about 
the very foundation of morality. If such were the case, however, 
religious questions would not arise. Certainly, there is no reason why 
human beings have to be religious, particularly if one postulates social 
existence as the foundation of self-existence. One might also deal with 
the problem of life and death from the point of view of society. But is it 
not human existence that lies at the ground of society? Religious values 
are not ordinary “values” but their antipodes. They are, as it were, 
value-negating values. It is in transcending [these ordinary] values that 
one encounters the holy.
The Self-Transcending Ground of Self-Existence
[Rationally speaking,] what is self-contradictory cannot exist—“exist” 
in the sense of being a subject which becomes a predicate, or a 
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predicate that becomes a subject, that is, as a rational, intelligible ex­
istence. Rational existence can never contain self-contradictions in 
itself. And yet our self is a thoroughly self-contradictory existence. We 
are both subject and predicate insofar as we think about ourselves [that 
is, we regard ourselves as individuals—that which becomes subject and 
not predicate—and at the same time are aware of our existence as such 
and predicate certain things about ourselves). We are both temporal 
and spatial insofar as we know our own activities. We have our self-ex­
istence in this self-contradiction. The more self-contradictory we are, 
the more fully do we become aware of ourselves. This is indeed a 
paradox, and it gives rise to a profound problem. Our self exists in self­
negation; it has its existence in the absolute nothing which cannot be 
conceived either in terms of the predicate or the subject. In order for 
such a self-contradictory existence to be possible, there must be 
something that is absolutely contradictorily self-identical at the ground 
of the self. This something must be contradictorily self-identically 
creative as the negation which is affirmation and as the affirmation 
which is negation; it is absolutely nothing and yet self-determining; it is 
absolutely nothing and yet absolutely being. Thus it is said, “Give rise 
to the mind which dwells nowhere” (Diamond Sutra 10c]. When speak­
ing of “the ground of the self/* some may think of a substantive 
ground or substratum in the direction of subject-oriented logic. But 
“at the ground of the self” according to the [logic of] contradictory 
self-identity has a totally different meaning—it is to be understood in 
terms of the affirmation of absolute negation. If we seek for the source 
of the self in the direction of the subject, the self vanishes, as shown in 
Spinoza’s notion of substance. On the other hand, if we seek for it in 
the direction of the predicate, it becomes absolutely rational, as 
demonstrated by the Fichtian development of Kant’s philosophy. 
Either way, the self is lost. The source that establishes the existence of 
the self-contradictory self cannot be found in either direction.
As the source of such existence, there must be something that 
enables our self-negation to make the self what it truly is. It should not 
simply mean that the self is negated, nor that our self becomes or ap­
proximates God or Buddha standing on the same ground [as Absolute 
Being]. Here the dynamism of what I call inverse correlation must be 
taken into account. DaitO Kokushi’s words, which I often quote, aptly 
express this relationship. This is why I maintain that the religious 
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world, as the self-determination of the absolutely contradictorily self­
identical topos, can be considered only by the logic of topos. Various 
misconceptions regarding the relationship between God and human be­
ings arise from the standpoint of objective logic. I do not abandon or 
exclude objective logic; indeed it must be present as a moment in the 
self-determination of concrete logic. Otherwise, however concrete the 
latter may be, it would not be logic. As Kant made clear, errors arise 
when one takes something that is objectively conceived for an actual, 
self-determining being, that is, when one substantivizes the concept.
The real self exists neither in the direction of the subject nor in the 
direction of the predicate, but where the self predicates itself in the con­
tradictory self-identity of both directions. At the ground of the self 
there is something thoroughly self-expressive. Just as that which does 
not act is nothing, so our self is something that acts. But it does not act 
merely spatially as if it were mere matter; nor does it act merely non- 
spatially, i.e., temporally, as if it were spirit or consciousness. The self 
acts creatively as the self-determination of the absolute present in the 
contradictory self-identity of time and space. The self acts by transcen­
ding so-called time and space and by mirroring the world within 
itself—-that is, it acts while knowing itself. At the depths of the self, 
there is something that thoroughly forms itself historically, and our 
self is born of it, acts in it, and dies to it. At the depths of our self, 
there is something that clearly transcends our conscious self. 
Moreover, this something is not anything external to us, but is that by 
which our conscious self is established and by virtue of which our self 
is thinkable. This something is nothing like the unconscious or instinct. 
Such an erroneous notion is brought about by objective logic.
Through the activity of “knowing,” the self transcends itself and 
stands outside itself. Conversely, the thing [the object of thinking] 
becomes the self and determines the self. The activity of knowing is 
established in the contradictory self-identity of the knower and the 
known. Be it “unconscious” or “instinct,” it already belongs to this 
kind of activity. What I mean by action-intuition is nothing other than 
this activity. At the depths of our self-awareness, there is something 
that thoroughly transcends us. This fact becomes more apparent as our 
self-awareness deepens. The true self acts from out of this point im- 
manently-transcendentally and transcendentally-immanently, i.e., in a 
contradictorily self-identical way. Intuition is present at the depth of 
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our self-awareness. Action-intuition is the term I use for this dialectical 
process mediated by negation. This is where the absolutely negative 
dialectic has its place, transcending the so-called dialectic of judgment. 
Otherwise, a dialectic would be nothing more than a private 
phenomenon within an abstract, conscious self. Action-intuition is not 
a kind of Kantian intellectual intuition; for while aesthetic intuition 
sees the self objectively, action-intuition sees things from the stand­
point of that self which transcends the self-conscious self.
There is something that thoroughly transcends the conscious self at 
the foundation of the self. This is the fact of self-awareness. Anyone 
reflecting deeply on the reality of one’s own self-awareness inevitably 
comes to this recognition. D. T. Suzuki calls it “spiritual nature” 
(reisei) [cf. Japanese Spirituality, SDZ VIII: 1-223 (1944)]. Further­
more, he says that the will power of the spirit transcends itself by being 
sustained by spiritual nature. The reality of spiritual nature is religious 
but not mystical. To consider religion mystical is a mistake to begin 
with. In fact scientific knowledge is also grounded on this point; it does 
not come about simply from an abstract, conscious self, but is grounded 
on a self-awareness of the physical self (cf. my essay, “The World of 
Physics”). This religious consciousness, as the fundamental fact of our 
life, forms the basis for both scholarly inquiry and morality. Religious 
awareness is not the monopoly of an elite but lies hidden in the hearts 
of each and every one of us. One who does not recognize this cannot be 
a philosopher.
Religious A wareness and Faith
Religious awareness resides in everyone’s heart but many are not aware 
of it. Even among those who are aware of it, not many embrace faith. 
What does it mean to embrace faith? What is religious faith? People 
often confuse religious faith with subjective beliefs; some go so far as 
to think that it is brought about by will power. But religious faith is an 
objective fact, an absolute fact of the self. It is what Suzuki Daisetz 
calls the “fact of spirituality.” At the bottom of the self there is 
something that utterly transcends us, and this something is neither 
foreign nor external to us. Therein lies the self-contradiction of the 
self. This is why we are confused as to the whereabouts of the self. 
Religious faith comes about when the self discovers the real self in a 
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thoroughly contradictorily self-identical way. Subjectively put, faith is 
peace of mind; objectively put, it is salvation.
We usually think that the source of the self exists either externally 
[i.e., objectively] in the direction of the logical subject, or internally in 
the direction of the predicate. In the former, our self is considered to 
be characterized by desire, and in the latter by reason. As I said before, 
however, the source of the self is to be found in neither direction. In 
psychological terms, it is not found merely in the sensory or in the voli­
tional, but in the absolutely contradictory self-identity of these two 
aspects. For this reason, in order for the self to embrace religious faith, 
there must be an absolute revolution in the position of the self. This is 
called conversion [metanoia]. Conversion is not a movement from one 
extreme to the other, as is commonly thought. Our self is neither beast­
ly nor angelic, which is why we are lost. We discover a peaceful resting 
place in a single revolutionary movement in and through contradictory 
self-identity itself. This is not a simple linear reversal of direction, but a 
circular movement—something like the “crosswise leap” of which 
Shinran speaks. It is clear that objective logic cannot deal with religion.
In religious conversion or liberation, one does not leave behind a 
self-conscious self which is desirous in one respect and rational in 
another, nor does one become unconscious. One rather becomes more 
clearly conscious to the point of one’s own self becoming intelligible. 
One never leaves the judging, conscious, discriminating self. Suzuki 
Daisetz calls this “non-discriminating discrimination.” Spiritual 
nature (reisei) is this non-discriminating discrimination. To regard it as 
mere unconsciousness not only betrays an ignorance about the nature 
of religious awareness, but also shows that one is conceiving the nature 
of religious consciousness only from the standpoint of objective logic.
In the previous chapter, I said that our self is established as the 
affirmation of the absolute self-negation of God, and that this is real 
creation. The absolute does not merely transcend the relative. If that 
were so, it would be merely negative, while in actuality it is relative. 
The true absolute faces its own absolute self-negation and embraces ab­
solute negation within itself; it mediates itself in an absolutely con­
tradictorily self-identical way through absolute negation—as the logic 
of sokuhi as the Diamond Sutra has it. Our self is established through 
God’s absolutely negating self-mediation; it exists at the outer limit of 
the self-negation of the absolute one into the individual many. Therein 
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our self, the self-projecting point of the absolute one, is the image of 
God and absolutely volitional.
That we exist through absolute self-negation means that we have our 
existence in knowing our own death and that we are bom only to die 
eternally. It is often said that one dies in order to live a greater life or 
that one lives through dying. (And yet what is dead enters nothingness 
for good; what has once died never comes back to life. An individual is 
unrepeatable; there are no two identical persons.) If, however, we con­
sider life in this way [that is, that we must die to live eternal life], such 
life is not truly alive but biologically alive; it is a life considered as exter­
nal to the self. Or it may be that one’s own personal life is considered in 
merely rational terms. Many moralists hold this view. Since reason is 
not subject to birth and death, life rationally considered is something 
external to the self.
Again, what is merely born and dies transmigrates forever, and this 
actually means eternal death. Eternal life is found in the identity of 
samsOra and nirvOna. The relationship between our self and God, the 
absolute, is best expressed by Daitd Kokushi’s words which I often 
quote. It is the relationship of a thorough, absolutely inverse correla­
tion. That samsQra is nirvana is meaningful only in this context. We 
must seek for the ground of our eternal life here. To attain eternal life 
does not mean that we depart from this life and enter the world of no­
birth, no-death, since originally there is no birth nor death. The now is 
eternal. As the Zen Master, Kanzan Egen [1277-1360, DaitO’s succ­
essor] says: “There is no birth or death in my life.” When we see the 
self as an objective existence according to objective logic, it appears to 
live and die endlessly and to transmigrate forever. This is the source of 
eternal delusion. But this is not to say that I consider objective logic a 
logic of delusion; in fact, when the topos determines itself in itself in a 
contradictorily self-identical way, it determines itself in accordance 
with the logic of objective logic. Delusion arises only in one’s clinging 
to that which is objectively determined or mentally thought as reality. 
This holds true for the scientific pursuit of knowledge as well as for 
religion.
The self is authentic when it knows its own eternal death. Once we 
have grasped this fact, we find ourselves already existing in eternal life. 
Thus, for the self to discern and become one contradictorily self-iden- 
tically with the source of itself is to embrace religious faith, to ex­
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perience conversion. This could not happen to the self objectively con­
ceived. Faith or conversion being the self-determination of the absolute 
itself, its attainment is made possible only by the power of God. Faith 
is grace, God’s beckoning at the ground of our self. This is why I say 
that at the depths of the self there is something that transcends the self 
and yet gives it its existence. Hence, birth is not birth; life-and-death 
(samsOra) is eternity itself.
Religious Reality as the Everyday World
In my discussion of life, I said that the world of our life is established 
where it expresses itself within itself as the self-determination of the ab­
solute present, and where, moving from the created to the creating, it 
endlessly forms itself spatio-temporally. Our life is established as the 
self-determination of the absolute present. In its spatial self-determina­
tion, it is thoroughly biological; in its temporal self-determination and 
expressive self-formation, it is conscious and spiritual. Ultimately, be­
ing the self-determination of the absolute present itself, the now of our 
self is the absolute present, as the alpha and omega of life [converge]. 
Our self thus determines itself by transcending time and space and by 
expressing in itself the world of the absolute present, the world of the 
eternal past and future. This is how we possess eternal life—life that is 
born and dies at every moment and yet is never born and never dies.
The world of the absolute, which contains absolute self-negation in 
itself and determines itself as absolute nothing, expresses itself within 
itself in a contradictorily self-identical way; it is the world of the ab­
solute present that embraces whatever stands against it. Thus [the Dia­
mond Sutra] says, “Give birth to the mind which dwells nowhere.” 
Medieval thinkers compared God to an infinite sphere whose cir­
cumference is nowhere and whose center is everywhere. This illustrates 
precisely what I call the self-determination of the absolute present. If 
one were to interpret these sayings merely in terms of abstract logic 
without reference to the spiritual reality of the self, they would be 
nothing but meaningless, self-contradictory notions. The real absolute, 
however, does not transcend the relative. The world of absolute being 
is the world wherein everything relates to it inversely in a contradictori­
ly self-identical way through the inverse determination of the one and 
the many. As the logic of sokuhi has it, it is absolutely being because it 
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is absolutely nothing; it is absolutely static because it is absolutely 
dynamic. Our self stands completely in this inverse determination and 
inverse correlation with the absolute One, God.
In regard to our life, to say that the now is the absolute present does 
not imply that the self transcends time abstractly. Each moment which 
does not pause even for a second stands in an inverse determination 
and inverse correlation with the eternal present. Hence, samsara is 
nirvana. To transcend oneself means to return to oneself and to realize 
the real self. Thus it is said that “all minds are no minds; therefore they 
are called minds” (Diamond Sutra 18b]. The meaning of the state­
ment, “The mind is Buddha and the Buddha is the mind” [cf. Obaku], 
is also intelligible in this context—it is not that mind and Buddha are 
identical in terms of an objective logic. The logic of emptiness of the 
PrajriaparamiU tradition cannot be grasped by occidental logic. But 
Buddhist scholars have yet to clarify this logic of sokuhi.
When we penetrate the depths of the self and go back to the ab­
solute, we do not part with the world of actuality. Instead we touch the 
bedrock of historical reality. As the self-determination of the absolute 
present, we become thoroughly historical individuals. “Having 
thoroughly penetrated the Dharmakaya [the realm of absolute truth], I 
found that there was not any thing there, just this Makabe no 
HeishirO.” Nansen says, “The ordinary mind, that is the Way” 
[Mumonkan 19). Rinzai says: “The Buddhist truth requires no con­
scious effort. It is the activity of everyday life: relieving oneself, dress­
ing, eating, drinking, and when tired, lying down” [Rinzairoku, JishU 
4). It would be missing the mark if we were to interpret these remarks 
as expressions of an irresponsible indifference to life. Rather, they ex­
press the total involvement of oneself, a path so painful that no step is 
taken without bloodshed. Transcending the discriminating mind is not 
the same as becoming indiscriminate. It rather signifies that the self tru­
ly becomes empty. As Ddgen says: “To pursue Buddha’s path is to pur­
sue oneself. To pursue oneself is to forget oneself. To forget oneself is 
to be confirmed by all things” [ShObOgenzO, GenjOkbari]. This is no 
different from the attitude adopted in the pursuit of scientific truth. To 
put this in other words; “I, becoming a thing, see; I, becoming a thing, 
hear.” What is to be negated is the dogmatism of the abstractly conceiv­
ed self; what is to be severed is attachment to the objectively conceived 
self.
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The more religious we become, the more we must forget our own 
self; we must fully exercise reason and feel deeply. The strictures of for­
malism cause religion to decay; dogmatism is the blade that cuts the 
root of life. Luther says in his Preface to Romans that faith is God at 
work within us. As we read in the first chapter of the Gospel of John, 
faith changes us and allows us to be born anew of God. It kills the old 
Adam and thoroughly transforms our heart, our spirit, our thought, 
and all our other faculties. It brings the Holy Spirit into our company. 
In Zen one attains Buddhahood upon seeing into one’s own nature 
[kenshb jobutsu]. ‘‘Seeing” here does not denote seeing something ex­
ternally and objectively or seeing oneself internally and introspectively. 
Just as the self cannot see itself, and as the eyeball cannot see itself, so 
there is no Buddha to be seen transcendentally. Whatever one imagines 
to be a transcendental Buddha is nothing but a ghost. “Seeing” 
signifies the revolution of the self and is identical with the attainment 
of faith. There is no religion without this revolution or conversion of 
the self. For this reason, too, religion cannot be grasped in the 
philosophical domain but only by the logic of topos.
To say that the self returns to its root source, i.e., to the absolute, in 
a contradictorily self-identical manner, and that the self, as the self- 
determination of the absolute present, is thoroughly ordinary and ra­
tional in the sense of “this now is the absolute present,” implies that 
the self is in some way eschatological as a historical individual. “The 
now is the absolute present” gives the self a freedom which transcends 
the cause and effect of the spatio-temporal world; this is the source of 
the activity of thinking. Even abstract cogitation is grounded on this. It 
also implies that our self, as the momentary self-determination of the 
absolute present, always stands in relation to the absolute being in an 
inverse correlation. The relationship that Tillich sets up between kairos 
and logos should be understood from this standpoint (cf. Paul Tillich, 
Kairos and Logos). Scholarly pursuits and morality are also founded 
on this standpoint.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“Man is but a reed,” said Pascal, “the weakest being in the natural 
world, but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself 
to crush him: a vapor, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. But, even if 
the universe were to crush him, man would still be nobler than what 
kills him, for he knows that he dies, and of the advantage which the 
universe has over him, the universe knows nothing” [Perishes, 
Brunschvicg 347]. The reason for the dignity of human beings is also 
the reason for their misery. Herein lies the wretchedness of the human 
world. Human beings come into existence in the contradictory self­
identity of time and space, from the world that moves from that which 
is created to that which creates. We are material and biological in our 
corporeality, and we are born historically and naturally. The world of 
life begins as the world expresses itself within itself and forms itself 
self-expressively in the contradictory self-identity of the many and the 
one. Time and space are but two opposite directions of this world. 
Even biological beings are already numerous individuals of the world 
and form themselves by expressing the world of the absolute present 
within themselves; they exist in accordance with the self-formation of 
the historical world. Animals are purposive and instinctive; and the 
more highly developed among them already possess desire. It is in this 
world of desires that joy and sorrow appear. Where the individual ex­
presses in itself the whole, it becomes desirous. Animals, qua in­
dividuals, also have souls. Individuals constantly desire to become the 
whole, but in doing so cease to be individuals—to be what they 
themselves are. The individual is the individual by virtue of confron­
ting another individual. The individual is thus thoroughly self-con­
tradictory and always in contact with absolute negation; it is born to be 
negated.
Desire is never satisfied; what is satisfied passes away and is no 
longer desire. Desire produces desire. It has been said that we vacillate 
to and fro like a pendulum between desire and its satisfaction. Thus, as 
the proverb says, the human world is full of suffering. Physical 
pleasure and pain exist because we are organically expressed in the 
world. Animals arc not yet real individuals in this sense, however, for 
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they are spatially universal, that is, material. Only human beings form 
themselves self-expressively in the contradictory self-identity of time 
and space. As the self-determination of the absolute present, as the 
self-expressing individuals of the self-expressive world, we form 
ourselves by transcending the world of spatial and temporal cause and 
effect. Thus we are cognitive, volitional, and conceptual. Moreover, we 
know our own action; our existence is stamped with the character of 
consciousness. This is why we consider our existence to be predicative, 
i.e., rational.
The world of human beings is not simply a world of pleasure and 
pain, but also of joy and sorrow, of suffering and agony. The reason 
for our dignity is precisely the reason for our wretchedness. As in­
dividuals born of the self-negation of Absolute Being, the more we 
become expressively self-forming, volitional, and personal, the more 
we face absolute negation, the Absolute One, in a contradictorily self­
identical way; in other words, the more we touch God inverse-cor- 
relatively. Thus at life’s very foundations we are ever in confrontation 
with the Absolute One, i.e., God. We stand at the crucial point where 
we can choose eternal life or death. Herein lies the eternal question of 
life or death. Barth says that faith is decision. At the same time, it is 
not human decision but objective reality, insofar as it is a human 
response to God’s call. Revelation is God’s gift given to human beings, 
and faith consists in human obedience to God’s decision in the form of 
one’s own decision (cf. K. Barth, Credo). As Paul says, “Yet not I, but 
Christ liveth in me’’ [Gal. 2.20], those who convert and attain to faith 
gain eternal life, and those who do not are forever damned to the fires 
of hell. The confrontation between God’s will and human will is 
always at work here, which is why religion becomes a question only for 
the thoroughly volitional and unique individual. Anyone who discusses 
religion should ponder this fact.
In authentic religion, one reaches faith by way of a sharply honed 
will, not out of mere sentiment. One embraces faith only having com­
pletely exhausted one’s resources. As the Pure Land parable of “the 
white path between two rivers’’ [Zendd, 613-681; TaishO 37, 272-73] 
teaches, sooner or later one has to choose between faith and non-faith. 
It is a gross misunderstanding to see Mahayana Buddhism as pan­
theistic. “Aesthetic religion” is no less a misnomer. The word “intui­
tion” may prompt a confusion between art and religion, but the two 
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stand at opposite poles. Ancient Greek religion is said to be aesthetic, 
but in reality it never reached the stage of full-fledged religion. Thus 
the Greeks turned to philosophy, while the Indians, though of the same 
Aryan origin, turned to religion. The Greeks knew no real awakening 
of the self-consciousness of the individual. In Plato’s philosophy there 
was no individual. Nor was the individual in Aristotle’s philosophy 
volitional. Certainly, it may be contended that in Indian philosophy 
there was much less awareness of the individual and that the individual 
as such was far more ignored. But I see a real negation of the individual 
in Indian philosophy. It may sound rather paradoxical, but the in­
dividual is consciously recognized by the Indian mind as that which is 
to be negated, and the will is absolutely negated in Indian religion. This 
religious insight poses a radical contrast to the religiosity of the 
Israelites. Indian culture also offers a sharp contrast to modem Euro­
pean culture, and for this very reason may have some things to offer to 
the modern world.
Religion as Total Engagement of the Self
Our world, as the contradictory self-identity of time and space, is the 
world of endless cause and effect; it moves from what is created to what 
creates as the absolute present determines itself. Although we are in­
dividuals of this world, precisely because we know the world by 
transcending it, as Pascal says, we are more precious than the whole 
universe that presses us to death. We come into being in a contradictori­
ly self-identical way as the self-negation of the absolute that determines 
itself self-expressively—that is, we come into being as the innumerable 
individuals of the Absolute One. This is why we are always in touch 
with the Absolute One in a self-negating, inversely correlative way. 
Hence, we live in eternal life in the manner of “life is death, death is 
life.” We are religious.
I maintain that the religious question is the question of the volitional 
self, of the individual. But this is not to say, contrary to a commonly 
held notion, that religion has to do with the peace of mind of the in­
dividual. The peace of mind of a desiring self has nothing to do with 
the religious question; if it did, religion would not even amount to a 
moral question. A desiring self that fears pain and seeks pleasure is not 
a real individual, but a mere biological entity. If religion is to be called 
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“opium” for that reason, so be it. The self as the self-negation of the 
Absolute One faces this Absolute One in an utterly inversely correlative 
way. The more it becomes an individual, the more it faces the Absolute 
One, i.e., God. It faces God at the outer limit of individual existence. 
At the limit of the individual self-determination of the historical world, 
the self faces the extremity of the holistic One in a thoroughly con­
tradictorily self-identical way. Thus each of us, while encompassing the 
eternal past and the eternal future, faces God as a representative of 
humankind. As the momentary determinations of the absolute present, 
we face the absolute present itself. In this we may be likened to the 
countless centers of the infinite sphere which has no circumference and 
yet whose center is everywhere.
When the Absolute determines itself as the absolutely contradictory 
self-identity of the many and the one, the world that has no ground of 
its own and is the self-determination of Absolute Nothing is volitional. 
To see the world as a holistic One assumes an absolute will confronted 
by the wills of innumerable individuals. In this way, the human world 
emerges from the world of sokuhi of the Prajfiap&ramita tradition. It is 
said: “Give birth to the mind which rests on nothing whatever” [Dia­
mond Sutra 10c]. Baso’s successor, Banzan HOjaku [8th century], 
says: “It is like wielding a sword in the air; whether the sword reaches 
the object or not is not the question. There is not even a trace of an 
empty circle drawn by the sword in the air, and the blade is untouched. 
If the mind is like this, it is not conscious of itself, it is utterly void of 
thought and imagination. The whole mind is Buddha, the whole Bud­
dha is the person. That the person and Buddha are no different is the 
beginning of the Way.” [Taishd 5, 253b] If one were to wield a sword 
in the air, it would leave no trace in the air and the sword would not be 
damaged at all. Likewise, the whole mind is Buddha and whole Bud­
dha is the person as the contradictory self-identity of self and world, of 
the individual and the whole. From the standpoint of objective logic, 
such a statement may appear pantheistic. But words of Zen masters 
should not be interpreted in that way, since they are thoroughly non- 
dualistic and contradictorily self-identical. The fullness of Buddha and 
the person are contradictorily—in the manner of sokuhi—one. A real 
individual person comes into being as the momentary self-determina­
tion of the absolute present. The phrase, “Give birth to the mind 
which rests on nothing whatever,” should be understood in this light.
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The will comes into being as the self-determination of Nothing. Our 
individual self, the volitional self, is neither subjective nor predicative 
existence, but arises in the contradictory self-identity of subject and 
predicate as the self-determination of topos. Therefore, just as a mo­
ment is said to be eternal, so we, thoroughly unique individuals, face 
the Absolute in an inversely determining way at every step we take. Rin- 
zai says: “In your body there is a real person of no fixed rank, who 
goes in and out through sense organs” [Rinzairoku, J Odo 3). To be 
“thoroughly an individual** is to stand at the extreme limit of being a 
human being; it is to stand as a representative of humankind. Shinran’s 
confession, “As 1 contemplate on Amida’s long-meditated vow, I 
come to realize that it was made for me, Shinran, alone’’ \TannishO, 
Concluding Section) has to be understood in this sense and not as a con­
fession of an egocentric individual. Morality is concerned with the 
general, religion with individuals, as Kierkegaard shows in 
distinguishing the knight of morality from the knight of faith. 
Agamemnon sacrificed Iphigenia and Abraham attempted to sacrifice 
Issac for two totally different reasons. Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembl­
ing has best clarified this point. One early morning, when Abraham, 
taking Issac, departed for the land of Moriah, he faced God as a 
singular individual; he stood at the outer limit of being human. God 
called him, “Abraham,*’ and Abraham responded, “Behold, here I 
am” [Gen. 22.1-11). He also stood there as a representative of the 
whole of humankind. God said, “In blessing I will bless thee, and in 
multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven .. . and in 
thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; because thou hast 
obeyed my voice” [Gen 22.17-18).
In the world of religion, that one transcends oneself and takes refuge 
in God does not mean that one aims at attaining peace of mind. It 
means that the human being is liberated from humanity itself; one 
faces the reality of God’s creation. In this God reveals himself, and the 
individual is confronted with the revelation. Thus it is said that to have 
faith means to obey God’s decision with one’s own decision. Faith 
does not mean subjective belief, but rather insight into the reality of 
how the historical world comes into being. The story of Adam’s fall 
through eating of the tree of knowledge against God’s command 
reveals that human beings came into existence as the self-negation of 
God. In Buddhist terms, this corresponds to the “sudden arising of
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thought” (The A wakening of Faith), Human beings originally come in­
to being self-contradictorily. And the more intellectual and volitional 
we become, the more this holds true. Human beings are marked by 
original sin. Morally speaking, it is absurd that the parents’ sin is 
transmitted to the children. But this is the nature of human existence. 
To transcend original sin means to transcend humanity itself. This is 
impossible from the side of human beings; we are saved only by believ­
ing in the reality of Christ, the revelation of God’s love. Thereby we 
return to the root of the self. We die in Adam and live in Christ. Accor­
ding to True Pure Land Buddhism, this world is through and through a 
world of action Ikarnta], of utter ignorance [avidyff], and of life-and- 
death [samsara], Thanks to Amida’s compassionate vow, we are saved 
solely by believing in the wonder of the Sacred Name of Amida Bud­
dha. This means that we respond to the call of Absolute Being. When 
we fully adopt this standpoint, “life-and-death has no birth [nor 
death],” as Zen Master Bankei [1622-1693] says [cf. Bankei Zenshi 
Goroku], In a contradictorily self-identical way, the totality of Buddha 
is humanity; humanity and Buddha are no different. It is like ‘‘wielding 
a sword in the air,” or as the Master Jdshu says, “like throwing a ball 
on the rapids: the stream flows, never ceasing even for a moment” 
[Hekigansha 80; JOshu Zenshi Goroku II, 243].
Two Types of Religious Relationship: 
Judeo-Christian and Buddhist
Religious relationship consists in the contradictory self-identity of 
what utterly transcends our self and establishes it (what is utterly 
transcendent and yet is the source of the self), and the utterly unique, 
individual, and volitional self. It consists in the contradictory self­
identity of the thoroughly transcendent and the thoroughly immanent. 
This relationship cannot be considered simply from without, objective­
ly, or from within, subjectively. It has to be apprehended in relation to 
the historical world, in relation to the self-determination of the ab­
solute present. Every historical world has something religious at its 
ground. A historical world, in its contradictory self-identity of space 
and time, is a world that forms itself self-expressively from that which 
is created to that which creates. Each and every one of us innumerable 
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individuals in this world is both thoroughly created and yet creating. 
We are self-expressive, self-forming elements of the world.
In this world there are two different attitudes that one can assume in 
relation to Absolute Being—that of a spatial self-determination of the 
absolute present and that of a temporal self-determination of the ab­
solute present. The historical world is usually considered simply as a 
world of spatial self-determination. But such a world is a world of 
nature, not of history. The world of history must contain human be­
ings in it. It must be a world of the mutual determination and contradic­
tory self-identity of subject and object. This means that the historical 
world is through and through the world of life, and that it expresses 
itself within itself and forms itself self-expressively.
In such a world we touch in an outward and spatial manner—in the 
so-called “objective” direction—that which expresses itself by 
transcending us, namely, the self-expression of Absolute Being. This is 
the direction to which Christianity has fundamentally adhered. 
Yahweh was originally the God of the Israelites. In the course of 
history, especially through the hardships they endured, the Israelites 
purified their idea of God and elevated it to the heights of Absolute Be­
ing. The prophets were seen as those who spoke the will of God—-the 
“mouthpieces of God.” During the Babylonian captivity when even 
their king was lost, their religion was inwardly deepened and elevated 
transcendentally by Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Buddhism, on the other 
hand, maintains that the self transcends itself and faces the transcen­
dent Absolute in the direction of the temporal self-determination of 
the world, that is, in the “subjective” direction. This inward 
transcendence is the mark of Buddhism.
The self-conscious self is not instinctive as a pure subject-term, i.e., 
as a merely spatial self-determination. Nor is it rational as a pure 
predicate-term, i.e., as a simply temporal self-determination. As the 
contradictory self-identity of space and time, it is both subjective and 
predicative, the individual determination and the universal determina­
tion. We are created and yet create, and as such we are history-form­
ing, volitional existence. Being utterly unique, individual, and voli­
tional, we face in an inversely correlative manner Absolute Being 
which transcends us both externally and internally. In the external 
direction, we face an absolute decree which is the self-expression of Ab-
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solute Being; we must obey it by denying ourselves. If we obey it, we 
live; if we do not, we are forever damned to hell. In the internal direc­
tion, however, Absolute Being persistently follows and ever embraces 
us who turn against him and desert him. That is, Absolute Being is in­
finitely compassionate. Here again we face Absolute Being as unique, 
individual, and volitional beings. Just as love consists in the contradic­
torily self-identical relationship of persons who stand over against one 
another, so does absolute love endlessly embrace those who rebel 
against it. The volitional self, which is thoroughly self-contradictory ex­
istence, confronts faces at the ground of being that which establishes it 
contradictorily self-identically. There we touch an absolute love that 
embraces our very existence. Personal existence does not come into be­
ing through a mere conflict of individual wills. For this reason, in every 
religion God is love in some sense.
I have said above that Absolute Being does not transcend the 
relative, and that what stands opposed to the relative is not truly ab­
solute. Truly Absolute Being negates itself and even manifests itself as 
devil. This is the meaning of religious updya, “skill in means.” In its ex­
ercise, Absolute Being sees itself even in the demonic. This is the basis 
for the doctrine of True Pure Land Buddhism that the wicked possess 
the necessary condition for salvation. Religion based on absolute love 
has its stronghold in such a teaching. Shinran said that Amida’s com­
passionate vow was made “for me, Shinran, alone.” The more we 
become unique, individual, and volitional, the more this confession 
holds true. Absolute Being through self-negation renders humanity tru­
ly human; and only in this way is it able to save human beings. The idea 
of updya or the miracles to which religious people testify is understan­
dable in terms of the absolute self-negation of Absolute Being. It is 
said that Buddha saves sentient beings even by manifesting himself as a 
devil. We can find in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation the same 
sense of divine self-negation. In Buddhist terms, this world is the world 
of Amida’s compassionate vow, the world of updya. Buddha saves 
human beings by assuming various forms.
Love, Creativity, and Religion
As I mentioned above, there are two contrasting modes of relationship 
between the self and the Absolute, on which two types of religion, the
98
THE LOGIC OF TOPOS
Christian and the Buddhist, are based. What is based abstractly on 
either one of these modes, however, is not religion in the true sense of 
the word. A merely transcendent God is not a real God. God must be 
love. Christianity maintains that God created the world out of love. 
This denotes the self-negation of the Absolute Being; it denotes God’s 
love. Likewise, moral obligation arises from the bottom of our hearts 
as we are embraced by absolute love. Generally speaking, love is not 
really understood. It is not the same thing as instinct. What is instinc­
tive is no more than self-centered desire. Genuine love is a contradic­
torily self-identical relationship between persons, between an “I” and 
a “Thou.” Were absolute love not present behind absolute moral 
obligation, it would be purely legalistic. Kierkegaard calls Christian 
love the “ought.” At the foundation of Kant’s “kingdom of ends” 
there must be pure love; only then does the “person” come into being. 
The instinctive or impersonal notion of love rests on a way of thinking 
that takes human existence simply as the subject of judgment in objec­
tive logic. On the contrary I hold that (to put it in Buddhist terms) real 
moral obligation comes out of the world of Buddha’s compassionate 
vow.
In the world of absolute love people do not judge one another; they 
create a world through their mutual respect and love, in the unity of 
self and others. From this perspective, all values are considered in the 
light of creativity. Creation must always stem from love. Without love 
there would be no creation. It is said that for the practitioners of nem- 
butsu [devotional chanting], chanting is neither religious practice nor 
performance of good deeds because it entails letting go of self-reliance 
and confiding in Buddha’s power [TannishO 8]. “To be artless and one 
with the workings of dharma” (Jinen hOni) [cf. Shin ran, MattbshO] is 
to be creative, in the sense that, as creative elements of the creative 
world, we act in accord with the self-determination of the absolute pre­
sent. In Christian terms, we exist eschatologically and experience 
“God’s decision as the human decision.” In the words of Zen Master 
Munan [1603-1676], “While living/ Be a dead man,/ Be thoroughly 
dead/ And behave as you like,/ And all’s well” [Sokushinki; tr. by D. 
T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 102]. In this way, the self, as 
the self-determination of the absolute present, is truly creative of the 
historical world.
Mirroring its Indian origins, Buddhism offers a very profound
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religious truth, but tends to be otherworldly. Even Mahayana Bud­
dhism has not achieved a truly realistic outlook on reality. Perhaps in 
Japanese Buddhism we can see an awareness of “absolute negation 
which is affirmation” in accordance with the Japanese mentality for 
which “reality is immediately absolute” [cf. Suzuki, Japanese 
Spirituality, p. 100]. We see this for example in Shinran who says, “[In 
nembutsu one] takes what is beyond human discrimination as the 
principle” [TannishO 10], and “being artless and one with the work­
ings of dharma.” But this aspect of Japanese spirituality has not been 
given proper recognition. If anything, it has been interpreted as mere 
passivity or irrational non-discrimination. I hold that real absolute ac­
tivity must be born of genuine absolute passivity. I also maintain that 
the judgment of judgments (that which transcends abstractly conscious 
judgments and embraces them and judges their appropriateness) or 
non-discriminating discrimination (which I call action-intuition) is a 
fundamental condition for the establishment of science. At the founda­
tion of scientific knowledge, “we see, becoming a thing, and we hear, 
becoming a thing.” This standpoint is what DOgen describes when he 
writes that “all dharmas authenticate the self” [ShObOgenzb, Gen- 
jOkOan]. Here again, we, the self-determination of the absolute pre­
sent, obey God’s decision with our own decision.
To be “non-discriminatingly discriminate” does not mean simply to 
become a subject-term and acquiesce to external constraints. Rather, it 
means that we obey that which transcends us and yet establishes our ex­
istence in the manner of the contradictory self-identity of subject and 
predicate, i.e., volitionally. Therefore, it is active-intuitive. Truly 
selfless action is active-intuitive. Moral action, which has the same 
basis, is also fundamentally religious. Those who are confined by the 
horizons of Kantian philosophy cannot see this. Truly other-reliant 
religion can be explained by the logic of topos alone; and once properly 
understood, this other-reliant religion which centers on the compas­
sionate vow of Amida can become vitally relevant to contemporary 
scientific culture. For this reason, today’s Zeitgeist may call for a 
religion of the absolutely compassionate vow rather than one of the 
Lord of hosts. In this new historical period, Buddhists need to engage 
in critical self-reflection. (We are fighting the present World War only 
to reject world war and establish everlasting peace.)
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Expression: The Bridge between God and Human Beings
The relationship between God and human beings is obviously not one 
of power, nor is it, contrary to the common opinion, a teleological rela­
tionship. The mutual relationship between absolutely opposing things 
is expressive. Absolute Being does not transcend the relative, but it has 
its existence and sees itself through its absolute self-negation. What 
stands opposed to Absolute Being—its absolute self-negation—is the 
self-expression of Absolute Being itself. The relationship between God 
and human beings must be grasped in terms of the relationship between 
what expresses itself thoroughly self-negatingly [i.e., God] and what 
gets expressed by [God] and faces him self-expressively. This relation­
ship is neither mechanical nor teleological, but it is an absolutely con­
tradictorily self-identical relationship between what thoroughly forms 
itself self-expressively, i.e., that which is utterly creative, and what, be­
ing created, creates, i.e., that which is created and yet creates. This is 
how independent entities interrelate, and in this relationship the dimen­
sion of creating and being created are essential.
Understanding others is a kind of action. But this does not mean 
that we are moved by something without or within; it means that we 
create ourselves self-expressively. The same holds true when we move 
others through our self-expression. It is not that the self becomes the 
other nor that the other becomes the self, but that the other creates its 
own self self-expressively. A mutual understanding between persons is 
established in this fashion. The self-expressive world is the self-forming 
world; the self-forming world is the self-expressive world. In the world 
of the absolutely contradictory self-identity of the one and the many, 
the world is expressive in its self-negating aspect, where the individuals 
stand in mutual opposition. Again, the world as a holistic one is for­
mative in its self-affirming aspect. There is no self-expressive world that 
is not self-forming in some way; likewise, there is no self-forming 
world that is not self-expressive in some way.
In the historically self-forming world, expression is power; it is the 
potential for a formative dynamic. Expression is not a simple “mean­
ing” as phenomenologists or hermeneuticists typically suppose. For 
them expression is what has been abstracted from the formational 
dynamism of expression. What they call ‘‘meaning” I see as merely the 
content of the world, considered statically, at the outer limit of the self­
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negation of the self-expressively self-forming world. Just as there is no 
sheer fact or activity in the historically forming world, neither is there 
sheer meaning. Whatever concretely exists forms itself self-expressive­
ly. Ultimately, our will exhibits this nature. The will has been con­
sidered abstractly in terms of the workings of consciousness; but if the 
will did not express the world within itself, there would be no volitional 
activity. That we, as the self-forming points of the world, express the 
world in ourselves and form the world in terms of the self-expression of 
the world—this is the will. Symbols have their own reality in this 
historical world; as self-expressions of the world, they have the power 
to form the historical world. What religious people call “the Word of 
God” must be understood in this sense. As Absolute Being sees itself in 
itself by negating itself, the human world—the historical world— 
comes into being. This is why it is said that God creates the world out 
of love.
The relationship between what thoroughly expresses itself and what 
expresses itself in being expressed must be regarded in terms of the rela­
tionship of expression, i.e., in the word. The word is the medium or the 
bridge between God and human beings. The relationship between God 
and human beings is not mechanical, teleological, or rational. God is 
present to us absolutely self-identically as absolute will; he expresses 
himself as the word that forms [the world]. This is revelation. The pro­
phets of Judaism were those who conveyed God’s will to the people of 
Israel: “Thus saith Yahweh, Lord of Sabaoth, God of Israel.” They 
were called the “mouthpiece of God.” I once said that the historical 
world always has a task and that the world derives its self-identity 
therefrom. A truly historical task in each epoch bears something of the 
nature of the word of God. In Jewish antiquity the historical task was 
something transcendent, and it was said: “Yahweh’s word faces me 
and thus speaks.” But today the historical task must be thoroughly im­
manent; it must be a self-expression arising from the bottom of the 
self-forming, historical world; but it should not be simply immanent. 
The historical world as the self-determination of the absolute present is 
always immanently transcendent and transcendentally immanent. A 
real philosopher is obliged to meditate deeply on the world as such and 
grasp its historical task.
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The Sacred Name of Buddha
In True Pure Land Buddhism, the Buddha is represented by his Sacred 
Name (myOgG). Human beings are saved by believing in the wonder of 
the Sacred Name. In order to realize the continuation of the discon­
tinuity between Absolute Being, i.e., Buddha, and human beings—in 
other words, for acontradictorily self-identical means—we are to rely 
only on the expression, the word. Nothing but the Sacred Name ex­
presses Amida’s absolutely compassionate vow. The Tannisho records 
Shinran’s words that “by the wonderful effect of the vow a name, 
which one could easily remember and chant, was carefully deliberated. 
Since there is the promise that 'whoever chants this name I shall 
receive,’ first of all I believe that ‘I shall free myself from life and death 
(samsQra) with the help of the wonderful power of Amida’s great com­
passion and the great vow’; and when I think that ‘It is the TathSgata’s 
careful deliberation that I can even chant the nembutsuf there being 
no calculation on my own part, I attain to true paradise according to 
the promise of the vow. In my believing in the mystery of the vow as 
the essential message, the wonder of the Sacred Name accrues to it, and 
the mystery of Amida’s vow and that of the Sacred Name are one and 
no different from each other” [TannishO 11].
The thoroughly inversely-correlative relationship between Absolute 
Being and human beings has to depend on expression, such as the 
Sacred Name of Buddha. This relationship is not of a sense-perceptual 
or rational kind. Reason, ever immanent, is the human standpoint and 
not the way to enter into interaction with Absolute Being. As I said 
before, we face Absolute Being at the very limit of our individual will, 
and God also faces us as the absolute will (therefore the relationship 
between God and human beings is always one of inverse correlativity). 
The word (as realizing the contradictorily self-identical relationship) is 
the sole means to cast a bridge between a will and the will. The word as 
logos is rational; but what is supra-rational, or non-rational for that 
matter, can also be expressed by, and only by means of, the word. The 
will transcends reason and breaks away from it. What utterly 
transcends and yet faces our self is that which expresses itself in a 
thoroughly objective manner. Granted that art is an objective expres­
sion, it is sensuous and not volitonal. A religious expression, in con­
trast, is absolutely volitional, and faces our self as a person.
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Buddha is totally transcendent to the self and yet embraces it. This 
was aptly expressed by Shinran: “That I can even chant the nembutsu 
is already thanks to Tathagata’s deeply considerate deliberation.” 
Herein lies the significance of Shinran’s “crosswise leap” which relies 
on the wonder of the Sacred Name. For any authentic religion to speak 
of faith or salvation, the contradictorily self-identical logic of paradox 
between Absolute Being and human beings must be present. This logic 
is neither sensuous nor rational, but pertains to the word understood as 
the self-expression of Absolute Being, the creative word. In Christiani­
ty it is said, “In the beginning was the Word” [John 1.1]; and referring 
to Christ, “The Word assumed flesh and dwelled among us” [John 
1.14J. So in Buddhism the Name is Buddha. The revelatory word, 
which is creative and salvific, and whose logic is one of paradox, is not 
merely irrational. It is the very self-expression of Absolute Being, 
which renders our self the real self, and reason real reason.
Shinran maintained that “what is beyond man’s discrimination is 
the principle of nembutsu” [Tannishb 10]. This does not mean that we 
become unconscious; rather it means that non-discriminating 
discrimination is set in motion. What is creative acts as the contradic­
tory self-identity of knowledge and action, as the self-determination of 
the absolute present. In Christianity, the word of God—revelation of 
the transcendent, personal God—implies that the absolute will cross-ex­
amines one. It is said that we are justified by faith. In contrast, the 
Sacred Name of Buddha, as the expression of Buddha’s great compas­
sion and love, embraces us and saves us. Such awareness culminates in 
a state of existence described as “being artless and one with the work­
ings of dharma” (jinen hOni). The idea of “jinen hbni” should not be 
interpreted to mean “naturalism,” as the ordinary sense of the word, 
jinen (nature) suggests. Because one is thoroughly embraced by the ab­
solutely compassionate vow, religious experience cannot be treated by 
objective logic. Moreover, in religious experience, one does not 
become merely sentimental and indiscriminate. Great wisdom arises 
from great compassion and love. Otherwise, it would be no more than 
selfish dogmatism or the play of logic. Where we “becoming a thing, 
think, and becoming a thing, see,” there is truth. To assume this stand­
point radically is to be compassionate; it is to act as the affirmation of 
the self-negation of Absolute Being. In order to know a person truly, 
we must take the standpoint of “no-thinking, no-imagining” (munen 
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musO). In the case of scientific truths as well, we attain the truth insofar 
as we are the self-determination of the absolute present and the self-ex- 
pressive points of the self-expressive world. Here again, our attitude is 
one of “being artless and one with the workings of dharma."
Compassion is not the negation of the will; rather genuine will is 
born of it. We are neither subjective nor predicative beings, but 
topological beings—both subjectively predicative and predicatively sub­
jective. This is why we are radically compassionate. Being in compas­
sion means that mutually opposing things become one in a contradic­
torily self-identical way. Will emerges as the self-determination of such 
a topological being. The will is instinctive in the subject aspect and ra­
tional in the predicate aspect, but as the self-determination of topos 
itself, it is history-forming. There is sincerity where there is no trace of 
the “I” present, where the self is the pure determination of topos itself. 
Moreover, genuine sincerity must be grounded on great compassion 
and love. This is the foundation of practical reason. The Kantian idea 
of morality is civic, but morality that forms history must be based on 
the compassionate vow of Amida Buddha. Suzuki Daisetz says that 
this idea of the ever-embracing compassionate vow (Azga/i) is absent in 
the foundations of Western culture. I suppose this is where oriental 
and occidental cultures fundamentally differ.
The Logic of Zen Buddhism
Regarding Zen Buddhism, which has exerted a great deal of influence 
on Japanese culture, 1 must defer to specialists. But I would like to say 
a word on a common misconception about Zen. Contrary to what 
many think, Zen is not mysticism. KenshO, “to see one’s original 
nature,” means that one reaches down to the bottom, to the very roots 
of one’s own self-existence. We come into being as the self-negation of 
the Absolute Being—as numerous individuals, we come into being 
through the self-negation of the absolute One. This is why our ex­
istence is fundamentally self-contradictory. The reality of self-con­
sciousness—that the self knows itself—is already self-contradictory. 
We always have our existence in that which is transcendent of the self, 
and we affirm ourselves in our self-negation. The discernment and ex­
periential grasp of this ground of the contradictory self-identity is what 
is meant by kensho. Thereby one grasps the logic of paradox. The kOan 
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practice of Zen Buddhism is a device to facilitate this experience. 
Shuzan [926-993] once said, holding up a bamboo stick in his hand, 
“If you call this a bamboo stick, you already miss its reality; if you do 
not call it that, then you are wrong. What do you call it?” (Mumonkan 
43].
The logic of paradox is not irrationality. It is, in Shinran’s words, to 
take as the discriminating principle that which goes beyond discrimina­
tion. It embraces the contradictory self-identity of the principle (ri) 
and the phenomenal C/7), of knowledge (chi) and praxis (gy&). In fact, 
scientific knowledge also comes about in this way. My phrase, “from 
the created to the creating,” stems from this standpoint, the standpoint 
of the self-determination of the historical world. Moreover, as the self- 
determination of the absolute present, it is an extremely ordinary stand­
point [i.e., the horizon of everyday existence] (byOj&ei). Rinzai said: 
“The Buddhist teaching requires no conscious effort; it consists simply 
in the ordinary course of events and nothing special: relieving yourself, 
dressing, eating, drinking, and when tired, lying down to rest. Stupid 
people laugh at me, but the wise know what I mean” [Rinzairoku, 
JishQ, 4]. These words should not be misconstrued, however. The es­
chatological reality is precisely the “ordinary standpoint.” Such a state­
ment as “The mind is Buddha and Buddha is the Mind” [Baso’s 
words; cf. Mumonkan 30] does not express a subjective or idealistic 
view of the world. Again, the saying, “All minds are originally no­
minds, therefore they are called minds” [Diamond Sutra 18b] has to be 
understood in terms of the contradictory self-identity of the mind and 
the Buddha (the individual and the whole), in accordance with the logic 
of sokuhi of the PrajfiSparamita tradition. All sorts of misunderstan­
dings concerning Zen stem from the objective logical way of thinking. 
What Western philosophy since Plotinus has called “mysticism” 
comes quite close to Oriental Zen, but in my opinion has not fundamen­
tally broken with the standpoint of objective logic. Actually, the One 
of Plotinus is diametrically opposed to Oriental Nothing, for it does 
not reach the ordinary standpoint. It is not that our mind exists and 
therefore that the world exists, nor is it simply that we look at the 
world from the standpoint of the individual self. Rather, the individual 
self is conceivable only in this historical world. The world of the con­
scious self, as I explained in my essay “Life,” arises as the self-deter­
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mination of the temporal aspect of this historical world. The subjective 
standpoint of the abstractly conscious self darkens our vision.
CHAPTER FIVE
WHILE THOSE WHO have had a deep religious experience and commit­
ted themselves to religion are few, religion cannot be reduced to a 
psychological state peculiar to certain individuals. So long as we are 
historical beings who are born, act, and die in the historical world, our 
existence is necessarily religious, and that from the very foundations of 
the self. The Absolute Being who exists and moves by itself does not 
transcend the relative; what simply transcends the relative is not ab­
solute. This historical world comes into being as the affirmation of the 
self-negation of true Absolute Being which contains within itself ab­
solute negation, and as the self-determination of the absolute present 
in the thoroughly contradictory self-identity of the many and the one. 
Each of us, as those who make up the innumerable individuals of this 
world, expresses the world and forms the world as its self-expressive 
point. This is the stuff of our existence. Since we come into being as the 
affirmation of the self-negation of the Absolute One, we have our ex­
istence in self-negation and are fundamentally religious, and our every 
action is historical as well as eschatological in that it is the self-deter­
mination of the absolute present. We obey God’s decision with our 
own decision. Truth is revelation. As the self-determination of the ab­
solute present, it is known kairologically. Truth, as the content of the 
self-determination of the absolute present, is universal and eternal, 
transcending all particularity of time and space. A moment is eternity; 
kairos is logos and logos is kairos. Difficulties concerning the relation­
ship between eternal truth and factual truths stem from an abstract con­
ception of time. Time has to be understood as the self-determination of 
the absolute present.
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The Ordinary Standpoint as the Locus of Freedom
That every action of ours is eschatological as the self-determination of 
the absolute present means that, in Rinzai’s words, our “whole being is 
in action** (zentaisayU) [Rinzairoku, Jisha 10]. Conversely, it means 
that “the Buddhist teaching has no room for conscious calculation** 
[Rinzairoku, JishU 4], and that the Buddhist path is the ordinary stand­
point [Rinzairoku, JishQ 4, also 9). It is clear from this that what I 
understand by eschatological is in a sense different from its Christian 
equivalent, as I do not consider it objectively and transcendentally, but 
immanently and transcendentally as the self-determination of the ab­
solute present. At the depths of our self there is nothing; we are utterly 
nothing and respond inverse-correlatively to the Absolute One. That 
we transcend ourselves at the ground of our self-existence or at the ex­
treme boundary of individuality, and respond to the Absolute One 
means that we transcend everything in that act. We transcend the 
historical world which is the self-determination of the absolute present; 
we transcend the past and the future. In so doing, we are absolutely 
free. This is the state that Banzan Hojaku describes as “just like 
wielding a sword in the air.*’ The standpoint of freedom which 
Dostoyevsky sought can only be this.
There is nothing at the base of the self that determines it. Nor is there 
anything instinctive in terms of the subject of judgment or anything ra­
tional in terms of the predicate. The self is completely devoid of any 
ground of its own. Therefore [as Rinzai says], it is “simply the or­
dinary course of events,” or what I call “the ordinary standpoint.” 
Again, it is said, “If one realizes one’s subjectivity, wherever one 
stands, one is authentic” [^/nza/roArw, Jisha 4]. Here we see the con­
trast between the personal freedom espoused by Kant—the epitome of 
the Western tradition—and the absolute freedom of which Rinzai 
speaks—the depths of the Eastern tradition. In the latter, everywhere 
the self becomes the self-expression of Absolute Being. We are not 
Nietzsche’s Man-God but God’s people, servants of the Lord. From 
the perspective of objective logic, the sayings of Zen masters may seem 
to be saying that one simply becomes nothing or loses one’s distinct 
identity. But to say that the self transcends itself at its own depths does 
not mean that it becomes nothing; rather it becomes the self-expressing 
point of the world, the real individual, the real self. Real knowledge 
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and morality stem from this standpoint at which the human world 
emerges as the outer limit of the self-negation of Absolute Being; and 
we come into being as the “many”—brought about by the self-nega- 
tion of the Absolute One. Thus we stand inverse-correlatively with the 
One. Shinran remarked that Amida’s vow was made for him, Shinran, 
alone. The more individual we become, the more we have to express 
our religious awareness in this way. We have our existence in the One 
inverse-correlatively. According to absolute negation which is at the 
same time affirmation, the ordinary standpoint is always present for 
the self, without any ground of its own. It is the reality of the self-deter­
mination of the absolute present itself, and as such it is the locus of ab­
solute freedom wherein every point is an Archimedean pou stO, so that 
“wherever one stands one is authentic.” The more individual we 
become, the more we stand absolutely freely at this ordinary stand­
point. So long as we are governed by instinct from without or by 
reason from within, we are not free. What I mean by freedom here is 
diametrically opposed to the modern Western idea of freedom. Human 
freedom is not a matter of Euclidean geometry.
From the standpoint of objective logic, my philosophical views 
might seem mystical. The logic of topos, however, is opposed to 
mystical philosophy insofar as it claims that the individual comes into 
being out of absolute negation and that this absolute negation is im­
mediately the ordinary standpoint. This has yet to be cast in logical 
form, but I think that the unity of these two extreme opposites of ab­
solute negation and the ordinary standpoint are present in the Japanese 
sensibility. The two aspects appear to be absolutely incompatible and 
yet one in the manner of “being artless and one with the workings of 
dharmay Mutai Risaku maintains that the quintessential Japanese 
spirit is found in the spirit of the poetry of the ManyOshQ and in 
Shinran’s absolute other-reliant religion. I suppose that the same spirit 
underlies the elusive beauty of TAe Tale of Genji or the simple elegance 
of Bashd’s poetry and the like. The real meaning of this Japanese sen­
sibility, however, has been distorted by an insular mentality and has 
remained at the level of a superficial everydayness; the Japanese have 
become self-complacent about it. In order to adopt a wider perspective 
of global history, Japanese sensibility needs today to assume a 
thoroughly eschatological quality and an earnestness that can embrace 
even Dostoyevsky’s concerns. This marks the starting point of a new 
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global culture. Dostoyevsky depicted human beings at their “vanishing 
points,” but his standpoint was detached from the ordinary stand­
point. This, I suppose, is the difference between the Russian and 
Japanese attitudes. But unless one’s concerns are connected with the or­
dinary standpoint, they are not realistic. They remain bound to an ap­
proach that leans toward the subject-term of judgment.
The Ordinary Standpoint, Common Sense, and Religion
The ordinary standpoint (byojbtei) should not to be identified with 
common sense. Common sense is a historically created, social system 
of knowledge. It is a habit formed in accordance with human propen­
sities. What I mean by the ordinary standpoint is a standpoint essential 
to our self-existence. It is indispensable for our personal existence, 
what makes a person a person. That is, it is the standpoint of real free 
will (although, as mentioned above, it stands in contrast to the Kantian 
notion of free will). The ordinary standpoint is the point at which we, 
who come into being as numerous individuals through the self-nega­
tion of the Absolute One, take our stand. It is the standpoint where we 
freely undergo a turnabout in a self-negation that is simultaneously a 
self-affirmation. It puts us in touch with the beginning and the end of 
the world. Put the other way, it is the alpha and the omega of our self. 
In a word, at the ordinary standpoint we are aware of the absolute pre­
sent. If it is called deep, it is infinitely deep—it can reach down to the 
very depths of this world. Again, if it is called shallow, it is groundless­
ly, infinitely shallow—it touches no surface and yet encompasses 
everything. This is why I call this ordinary standpoint eschatological. 
Our historical consciousness, which always comes into being at this 
standpoint, is the awareness of the absolute present. This is why, from 
this standpoint, we can think of the past and the future without limits. 
History is not something that can be viewed from the standpoint of a 
merely abstractly conscious self; what is conceived from such a stand­
point is simply autobiography. Because the ordinary standpoint is 
always eschatological, the world, in the contradictory self-identity of 
time and space and inside and outside [of one’s consciousness], has the 
dynamism of “the created creating.” In upholding abstract logic, 
Western philosophy recognizes the abstract standpoint of free will, but 
the idea expressed by the ordinary standpoint that I am proposing is 
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foreign to it. As I said, so-called common sense needs to be distinguish­
ed clearly from what I call the ordinary standpoint, but the two have 
something in common. Common sense is formed on the basis of what 
is the ordinary standpoint for the self. In this regard, my attention is 
drawn to what the French call le bon sens (see Montaigne’s discussion 
of Socrates’ attitude in “On Physiognomy,” Essays III, 12).
The most concrete standpoint for us is the deepest and the 
shallowest, the maximum and the minimum standpoint—in other 
words, what I call the ordinary standpoint. It is the standpoint of 
Pascal’s roseau pensant (“thinking reed”). The Kantians hold that 
knowledge takes shape as an intuitively given mediated by abstract 
logic; they also hold that science begins with the denial of common 
sense. But simply negating the given and moving away from the in­
tuitive nature of knowledge by way of abstract logic, does not bring us 
to the truth. For any objective knowledge, the beginning and the end 
must always be connected. Kant himself, unlike his later followers, 
took seriously the connection between knowledge and the immediately 
given. The furthest and the nearest is the truest. Truth requires that the 
starting point not be lost, however far one may go, indeed that one ac­
tually return to it. This is precisely what I call action-intuition. Com­
mon sense is doxa, opinion, and as such needs to be roundly negated. 
But common sense also contains an element of the ordinary stand­
point. This is why knowledge and morality are held to stem from com­
mon sense and return to it (although common sense is far from pure). 
What opposes against common sense is neither true nor good. Hence, 
what is to be negated is not intuition but doxa. When seen from the or­
dinary standpoint of human beings who create and are created, Newto­
nian physics, the foundation of remarkable developments in modern 
physics, was a kind of doxa. Theories of relativity and quantum 
mechanics in our own day amply testify to the fact. The absolute no­
tions of time and space turned out in fact to be no more than concepts 
relative to the functions of measurement. Langevin says that quantum 
physics does not negate determinism but rather renders it precise in a 
more human and concrete way.
The standpoint of religion consists of a radical appropriation of the 
standpoint of the eternal past and the future of the historical world, 
the standpoint where the beginning and the end of human beings meet, 
the standpoint which is the deepest and the shallowest, the furthest and 
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the nearest, the maximum and the minimum—that is, the ordinary 
standpoint. To be religiously aware means that we human beings never 
lose sight of the source of human existence. The standpoint of religion 
has no fixed content of its own, because it is the standpoint of stand­
points. If religion had a fixed content, it would be no more than 
superstition. Religious creeds need to be understood in a radically sym­
bolic manner, as immediate self-expressions of our historical existence. 
Only in this way do symbols have religious significance. The real end of 
religion lies in grasping eternal life, a grasp that has no ground of its 
own. It consists of a total appropriation of the ordinary standpoint. To 
say, ‘‘[Religious reality] is but I, Makabe no Heishird” is not only to 
negate all standpoints but also to establish them. It is the stand­
pointless standpoint, the point from where infinitely great wisdom and 
great action emerge. It is said that “a drop of water from the deep 
source is inexhaustible.” The standpoints of truth, good, and beauty 
derive from the same source.
The Religious Origin of the Historical World
People often say religion is mystical. But there is no special con­
sciousness corresponding to religion. It is said that there is no mystery 
in the true teaching (dharma). What is mystical is of no use to our prac­
tical life. If religion were a consciousness peculiar to some individuals, 
it would be but the idle pastime of a person of leisure. It is said that 
“The Way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What can be 
separated from us is not the Way” [The Doctrine of the Middle, 1.1]. 
And again, “Even in moments of haste, one acts according to the Way 
[of humanity]. Even in times of difficulty or confusion, one acts accor­
ding to the Way” [Analects 4.5]. Religion does not exist apart from the 
“ordinary mind.” Nansen says: “The ordinary mind, that is the Way” 
[Mumonkan 19]. We must thoroughly pierce through the bottom of 
this “ordinary mind.” As the self-determination of the absolute pre­
sent, we are always in touch with the Absolute One in an inversely cor­
relative way. In each step we take, we are eschatologically connected 
with the beginning and the end of the world. Therefore, Nansen says: 
“If one tries to search for it, one departs from it.” When asked, “But 
if one does not try, how does one know the way?” he replied: “The
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way does not belong to knowing or non-knowing” [Mumonkan 19; 
JOshu Goroku 1]. This is religious awareness.
Religion is not something that takes place within the consciousness 
of an individual, but it is a matter of the self-awareness of historical 
life itself. This is why historically and socially speaking, any religion 
begins with folk belief. The founders of religions are those who suc­
ceed in bringing this belief to full articulation. They are the 
1 ‘mouthpieces of God,” as the prophets of Israel were called. As the 
self-forming historical world expresses itself, historical society comes 
into being. Emile Durkheim said that there was something sacred 
(sacre) at the origins of society. A folk belief shares its vicissitudes with 
its people. State religions, such as that of the Greeks and the Romans, 
perished with their peoples. But a genuine religion is not something 
that exists for a particular state; on the contrary, the raison d’etre of 
the state, as the self-expression of historical life, consists in its being 
religious. A genuine state exists where the people possess the world­
principle within themselves and form themselves within and in accord 
with the historical world. The religion of Yahweh was originally a folk 
religion of the Israelites; but they took their belief beyond the level of 
folk belief, deepened it, and elevated it to the level of a world religion. 
During the time of the Babylonian captivity, they may have lost their 
land but they never lost their religion or their spiritual confidence in be­
ing a chosen people, a confidence that did not lie in military might or 
glory. Prophets such as Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Second Isaiah 
deepened and refined their religion. Jeremiah was an uncompromising 
patriot; he considered Nebuchadnezzar a servant of Yahweh and ad­
monished his subjects.
The historical world, as the self-determination of Absolute Being, 
comes into being in the absolute present. Now since what expresses 
itself and what is expressed are one, the historical world, as the self-ex­
pression of self-expressive Absolute Being, contains within itself its 
self-expression and forms itself self-expressively. Thus the historical 
world is at its root religious and metaphysical. Every race, as part of 
the historical world, comes into being in this manner, and this is what 
distinguishes a race as a historical species from a merely biological 
species. At the foundation of any realm of life, including biological 
life, the self-expression of the world is always present. As the blood of 
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a race comes to form itself in a self-expressive way, it becomes a 
historical species (cf. my discussion on “Life”). Moreover, as Ranke 
has pointed out, there is no such a thing as a singular race, which 
would be a mere abstraction. The world at its beginning is spatial— 
made up of various races, to be sure, but existing in juxtaposition to 
one another. The world of the absolute present which has not yet 
entered into a temporal interaction is not yet self-forming in itself, and 
is not yet the world of world history. But as the world becomes self-for­
ming in the sense of the created creating, it becomes more concrete and 
begins to have a center of its own. The two-dimensional world unfolds 
into a three-dimensional world. In this the world is consciously ap­
prehended for the first time—that is, the world becomes self-conscious.
The content of this self-formation of the historical world in the ab­
solute present is culture, at whose ground there is always something 
religious at work. The global world transcends simple racial 
characteristics and achieves its self-identity in a world religion. Chris­
tianity, which grew out of the folk belief of Israel, played this role of 
world religion in Europe during the Middle Ages. In the East a global 
world in the Western sense of the word never took shape. Still, it seems 
to me that not only Buddhism but Confucianism can claim the 
character of a world religion. It is said that during the Spring and 
Autumn Period in China, the Chinese distinguished themselves from 
the barbarians by possessing the idea of propriety (Chin., //).
Modernity and Religion
When the historical world—the self-determination of the absolute pre­
sent—transcends the racial stage and forms a global world, some may 
consider that the world loses all of its varying traditions and becomes 
characterless, abstract, universal, irreligious, and scientific. This is the 
direction modern European development has taken. As the self-nega­
tion which is simultaneously the affirmation of Absolute Being, such a 
negative aspect must of course be intrinsically present in the direction 
of the self-formation of the global world. The historical world contains 
an element that negates humanity. But the Absolute does not simply 
transcend the relative; the real Absolute thoroughly contains within 
itself its own self-negation. Accordingly, the relative entities are not 
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simply abstracted from the Absolute, but they signify the negation of 
the Absolute. They are the “many” that stand against the “one.” 
Therefore, one aspect of the self-forming development of the historical 
world must be the dynamic of the world’s losing itself. Precisely 
because the world contains such self-negation at core, it is considered 
an Absolute Reality that exists of itself and moves of itself. Sheer self­
negation can hardly yield a reality that exists of itself.
The material world is something abstractly conceived. The scientific 
world, as the self-negating aspect of the historical world, is also con­
ceived in relation to humanity. For this reason, science is a branch of 
culture. We human beings are scientific in that we have our existence in 
our self-negation. Religiously speaking, this implies that God sees 
himself in his self-negation. In this sense, the scientific world can be 
considered religious. Kepler’s astronomy is said to have been 
something religious. God has his existence in his self-negation. In 
Hegelian terms, this is the world of the self-alienating Spirit.
At this point, I would like to clarify, from my own standpoint, the 
relationship between religion and culture. In one respect religion and 
culture are opposed to each other. Today’s dialectical theology stresses 
this point as a reaction against former views. For my part, I do not con­
sider a God who cannot enter into the realm of self-negation, a God 
who does not contain within himself his real self-negation, to be real 
Absolute Being. Such a God may be the judge of the world, but is not 
its absolute savior; he may be a transcendentally sovereign God, but is 
not a fully immanent and absolutely loving God. Real culture is 
established as the affirmation of the self-negating Absolute Being. 
From our perspective as human beings, we discover the truly objective 
and eternal content of culture when we negate ourselves, assume a self­
existence in what transcends us from within, and act as the self-form­
ing dynamism of the historical world. As the self-determination of the 
absolute present, culture is the content of the self-forming form. In con­
trast to the dialectical theologians, I maintain accordingly that real 
culture must be established religiously and also that real religion must 
be cultural. What simply negates culture is not real religion, but 
transcendent and void of content, a religion that merely denies humani­
ty. A religion that crowns God as sovereign has this tendency. While I 
am sympathetic to contemporary theology in its stress on the transcen­
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dent character of religion over against the immanent and rational 
religion propounded by older theology, I cannot help but detect certain 
reactionary elements in it.
Although I maintain that real religion must be cultural, I do not 
mean to consider religion in terms of culture. I do not treat religion in a 
purely rational or immanent way. Religion cannot be simply imma­
nent; it must be immanently transcendent and transcendentally imma­
nent. Because religion exists in the absolutely contradictory self-identi­
ty of immanence and transcendence, it eludes conventional logic that 
emphasizes the subject-term of judgment or objective logic. This is 
why religion inevitably appears mystical to those who approach it from 
those standpoints. Misunderstandings and insufficient knowledge of 
religion are all due to approaches based on abstract logic. The logic of 
religion, as formative of the historical world, is absolutely dialectical. 
Even Hegel’s logic did not arrive at this point.
To approach religion rationally from the perspective of the imma­
nent world of human beings is in effect to deny religion, a denial which 
amounts to the world’s loss of itself, to humanity’s loss of itself, and to 
the self’s loss of its true identity. This denial misses the originally self­
contradictory character of human existence. This is why I maintain 
that real culture must be religious and that real religion must be 
cultural. We find God hidden [deus absconditus; cf. Isaiah 45.15] 
behind real culture. But when human beings to adhere solely to the 
human standpoint without any recourse to religion, proceeding strictly 
in the direction of culture alone, the world ends up denying itself and 
we human beings losing ourselves. This has been the orientation of 
European culture since the Renaissance, which explains why some have 
come to lament the decline of Western culture. When the world loses 
itself and human beings forget God, humanity becomes wholly in­
dividualistic and self-interested. The world becomes only a stage for 
play or combat. All is in chaos. The direction of culture ultimately 
negates genuine culture. Of late, some of those who are apprehensive 
about the future of European culture have advocated a return to the 
Middle Ages (e.g., Dawson). Despite the careless claim that history 
repeats itself, in fact, it does not. History is a new creation at every 
step. Modernity has developed out of medieval culture through 
historical necessities, and it is not possible to go back to the standpoint 
of medieval culture, nor is this the way to save modern culture. A new 
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cultural direction needs to be sought today; a new humanity must be 
born.
Christianity, which formed the core of the self-understanding of the 
medieval world, was a religion characterized by objective 
transcendence. It was the religion of a sovereign God, which joined 
hands with the secular power so that Peter’s successor becoming 
Caesar’s successor as well. This kind of religion denies religion itself. 
What belongs to Caesar must be rendered entirely to Caesar. Religion 
cannot pose behind the sword of Caesar. This world, as the created, 
must of historical necessity move on to become the creating. Tillich 
says that Protestantism took nature as the locus of decision making. 
We must proceed in this direction, in the direction of finding God in his 
self-negation. To proceed only in the immanent direction, however, 
means that the world loses itself and that human beings deny humanity 
itself. We must rather transcend ourselves inwardly. This immanent 
transcendence is precisely that which opens the way to a new culture.
In this connection, 1 find Ivan Karamazov’s prose poem interesting. 
Moved by the pleas of humanity, “Lord God, may Thou manifest 
Thyself to us,” Christ reappears in the human world. The setting is 
Seville in Spain; the time, around the fifteenth century, the horrible 
time of the Inquisition when many were burned daily ad majorem Dei 
gloriam. The cardinal, the Grand Inquisitor, sees Christ performing a 
miracle and his face darkens with fear. He orders soldiers to seize him 
and put him in jail. He accuses Christ: “Why art Thou come to hinder 
us? Thou hast no right to add anything to what Thou hast said of old. 
The freedom of people’s faith was dearer to Thee than anything in 
those days fifteen hundred years ago. Didst Thou not often say then, ‘I 
will make you free’? But now Thou hast seen these ‘free’ men. We have 
completed that work in Thy name. People are more persuaded than 
ever that they have perfect freedom. Yet they have brought their 
freedom to us and laid it humbly at our feet. But that has been our do­
ing. Was this what Thou didst? Was this Thy freedom?” That is, the in­
quisitors have vanquished freedom and have done so to make people 
happy. “For nothing has ever been more insupportable for a man than 
freedom. Christ rejected the only way of making people happy by say­
ing that man did not live by bread alone. But fortunately, when Christ 
departed from this world, he turned over his task to the Roman Pope. 
How can you deprive us of that authority now? Why art Thou come to 
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hinder us? Tomorrow I shall burn Thee.** In response, Christ remains 
silent, never uttering a word, as if a shadow. The next day when he is 
about to be released, Christ approaches the old man and kisses him 
without a word. The old man shudders [The Brothers Karamazov].
This Christ, silent from beginning to end like a shadow, is the Christ 
of what I call immanent transcendence. Of course, Dostoyevsky or any 
other Christian would not say this; it is my own interpretation. But a 
new Christian world may be opened up with the Christ viewed in terms 
of immanent transcendence; a return to the medieval world is 
anachronistic. In the manner of “being artless and one with the work­
ings of dharma/* we see the real God where there is no God. I wonder 
whether Buddhism, standing on the horizon of global history today, 
could contribute something to the new era. Certainly, the old conven­
tional Buddhism is only an antique. Even if a religion is a universal 
religion, so long as it is formed in history, it bears certain par­
ticularities according to the time and the place of the people who give 
shape to it. Even though the essentials of religion may be preserved, it 
is inevitable that any religion exhibits demerits along with its merits. I 
merely propose that for the religion of the future, the direction of im­
manent transcendence is more promising than one of transcendent im­
manence.
(I am basically in agreement with the general orientation of Ber­
dyaev’s Meaning of History, even though his philosophy has not 
broken with Boehmean mysticism. The new age must be first and 
foremost scientific. Tillich’s Kairos and Logos has something in com­
mon with my epistemology, but its logic is not clear. Today, these new 
currents of thought must be given a thoroughly logical foundation.)
The State and Religion
Regarding the relationship between the state (kokka) and religion, I 
have touched on this subject on various occasions since my 
Philosophical Essays IV [1940]. Each state is a world in itself, contain­
ing within itself the self-expression of Absolute Being. Hence, when a 
folk society harbors in itself the self-expression of the world, i.e., when 
it becomes rational, it becomes a state. This alone constitutes a state. 
In this sense, the state is religious. The historical world, which is 
religious at its ground of coming into being, forms itself so as to 
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becomes the state. The historical world realizes itself in the form of 
states, but the state as such is not Absolute Being. It may be the source 
of morality, but not of religion. As the modality of the self-formation 
of Absolute Being, the state commands the conformity of our moral ac­
tion, but it is not the savior of our soul. The real state must be religious 
at its roots. As a corollary, one who has undergone real religious con­
version must naturally be a member of the state in his history-forming 
praxis. The standpoint of religion and that of the state must also be 
clearly distinguished. The alternative is a medieval view that would 
hinder the genuine development of both religion and the state. This is 
why modem states have recognized freedom of belief.
While the affinity between Christianity, the religion of a sovereign 
God, and the state is easy to see, Buddhism has sometimes been 
thought to have nothing to do with the state. But Suzuki Daisetz 
quotes from the Daimurybju-kyb, ch. 41 [actually, ch. 391: “The con­
gregation of the ‘four groups’ [comprised of bhikut a monk; bhik- 
uni, a nun; upOsaka, a lay male devotee; and upasikn, a lay female 
devotee] look at the other shore and at the same time those of the other 
shore look at this shore; they are exactly the same”; and writes that 
just as the congregation centered around the Buddha on this shore sees 
the Pure Land, so this shore is seen by the congregation of the other 
shore. The world of human beings (shaba) reflects the Pure Land 
(jbdo)t and the Pure Land reflects the world of humanity. Clear mir­
rors mirror each other. This suggests the intrinsic continuity or the 
identity of the Pure Land and the human world (cf. Suzuki Daisetz, 
JOdokei Shisdron, p. 104, [SDZ VI 1-320]). It helps us to imagine the 
state in the spirit of True Pure Land Buddhism: the reflection of the 
Pure Land in this land.
Translated by Yusa Michiko
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